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___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Debra Haybarger appeals the District Court‟s decision
granting summary judgment to William Mancino on her
claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”),
29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Haybarger contends that the District
Court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, Mancino was
not her “employer” under the FMLA. As a threshold matter,
we hold on an issue of first impression in our Court that a
supervisor in a public agency may be subject to individual
liability under the FMLA. We further hold that there exists a
genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Mancino
is himself subject to such liability. Accordingly, we will
vacate and remand the matter to the District Court.
I.
In 1988, Debra Haybarger began working as an office
manager for Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole
(“Lawrence County Probation”), an agency of the Lawrence
County Court of Common Pleas. Beginning in 2001, her
supervisor was William Mancino, the Director of Probation
and Parole. Mancino reported to Michael Occhibone, the
court administrator, who reported to Judge Dominick Motto,
the President Judge of the Lawrence County Court of
Common Pleas.
Haybarger has Type II diabetes, heart disease, and
kidney problems, which forced her to miss work frequently to
seek medical attention. Haybarger testified that Mancino
expressed dissatisfaction with her absences despite
recognizing that they were due to illness. Most notably,
Mancino repeatedly wrote in his annual performance
evaluations that Haybarger needed “[t]o improve her overall
health and cut down on the days that she misses due to
illness.” (A. 73, 78.) She also testified that he asked her why
she breathed heavily and why she needed to visit the doctor
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so often, and advised her that she needed to “start taking
better care of [her]self.” (A. 135.)
On March 23, 2004, Mancino formally disciplined
Haybarger by placing her on a six-month probationary period
that required weekly informal progress assessments and
monthly formal meetings. Mancino alleged in his discipline
letter that Haybarger‟s “conduct, work ethic[,] and behavior
[were] non-conducive to the Adult Probation Office.” (A.
92.) He further alleged that she demonstrated a “lack of
leadership,” “no clear understanding of the subordinate
positions” that she supervised, and “a lack[] [of] empathy to
subordinate workers.” (A. 92.) Mancino testified during his
deposition that he consulted with Occhibone before issuing
the discipline letter, but that he had the independent authority
to issue the letter on his own and did not require Occhibone‟s
approval.
Approximately six months later, Mancino informed
Occhibone and Judge Motto that Haybarger‟s job
performance had not improved since he disciplined her in
March 2004. Mancino claims that he did not have authority
to terminate Haybarger‟s employment, but he admits that he
advised Judge Motto to dismiss her. Further, he wrote in a
summary of Haybarger‟s dismissal to Lawrence County
Probation‟s Human Resources department (“Human
Resources”) that after two meetings with Occhibone
concerning Haybarger‟s performance, he “told [Occhibone]
that [he] had decided that [he] had no other alternative at this
time but to terminate her employment.” (A. 96.) According
to Occhibone, Judge Motto agreed with Mancino‟s
recommendation, believing “that Mr. Mancino took all
measures to help Ms. Haybarger retain employment and that
unfortunately . . . termination was necessary.” (A. 98.)
Accordingly, Mancino wrote in his summary to Human
Resources that Judge Motto “permitted [him] to terminate
her.” (A. 96.)
Mancino, Occhibone, and Judge Motto informed
Haybarger of her termination at a meeting in the courthouse
on October 4, 2004. Additionally, Mancino wrote
Haybarger‟s termination letter on the same date, stating that
“[u]pon final review of your probationary period, I feel that
3

no progress or [sic] has been made by you, further, that you
are incapable of performing at the level necessary to complete
your assigned duties as the Office Manager in my office.”
(A. 99.) He further stated that “[a]fter conferring with the
District Court Administrator, Michael Occhibone, and the
President Judge, Dominick Motto, we are in agreement that
your termination . . . is necessary and in the best interest of
the overall operations of the Adult Probation Office.” (A.
99.)
Haybarger sued Lawrence County Probation, the
County of Lawrence, and Mancino under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the “PHRA”), 43 Pa.
Const. Stat. § 951, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et
seq., and the FMLA. On March 14, 2007, the District Court
dismissed all of Haybarger‟s claims against the County of
Lawrence; Haybarger‟s ADA, FMLA, and PHRA claims
against Lawrence County Probation; Haybarger‟s FMLA
claims against Mancino in his official capacity; and
Haybarger‟s ADA claim against Mancino in both his
individual and official capacities. There thus remained
pending the Rehabilitation Act claim against Lawrence
County Probation and the FMLA and PHRA claims against
Mancino in his individual capacity.
After limited discovery, Lawrence County Probation
moved for summary judgment based on the Eleventh
Amendment. The District Court denied Lawrence County
Probation‟s motion for summary judgment, and we affirmed.
See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551
F.3d 193, 203 (3d Cir. 2008).
On remand, Lawrence County Probation moved for
summary judgment on Haybarger‟s Rehabilitation Act claim,
and Mancino moved for summary judgment on Haybarger‟s
FMLA claim.1 The District Court denied summary judgment
on Haybarger‟s Rehabilitation Act claim, and Lawrence
County Probation and Haybarger subsequently settled the
Rehabilitation Act claim.
1

Haybarger conceded that she cannot present a viable
PHRA claim against Mancino.
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As to the FMLA claim against Mancino in his
individual capacity, the District Court held that, while the
FMLA permits individual liability against supervisors at
public agencies, Haybarger failed to present sufficient
evidence to hold Mancino liable. The District Court reasoned
that an individual supervisor is an “employer” for FMLA
purposes only if he or she has “sufficient control over the
[employee‟s] conditions and terms of employment.”
Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, No. 06862, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70421, at *27 (W.D. Pa. July 13,
2010) (quoting Kilvitis v. Cnty. of Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d
403, 413 (M.D. Pa. 1999)). The District Court then stated
that an employer has adequate control if he or she “has the
authority to hire and fire.” Id. (quoting Narodetsky v.
Cardone Indus., No. 09-4734, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16133,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2010)). Because Mancino lacked
final authority to fire Haybarger, the District Court concluded
that Mancino did not have sufficient control over Haybarger‟s
employment for liability to attach and granted Mancino‟s
motion for summary judgment. Haybarger filed her instant
appeal, contending that a genuine dispute of material fact
remains concerning whether Mancino was her employer
under the FMLA.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 We
2

We have jurisdiction to consider only final orders
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Except in limited circumstances, we
“will not entertain an appeal unless the district court‟s order
„ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for
the court to do but execute the judgment.‟” Bethel v.
McAllister Bros., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. 863, 867
(1994)) (citations omitted). A district court order dismissing
without prejudice is usually not a final order. See Borelli v.
City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per
curiam). The District Court entered summary judgment in
favor of Mancino on Haybarger‟s FMLA claim on July 14,
2010. Still pending at that time was Haybarger‟s
Rehabilitation Act claim against Lawrence County Probation.
5

exercise plenary review over district court decisions granting
summary judgment. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co.,
206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is
appropriate when the movant demonstrates that there is no
“genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A material fact is “[a] fact[] that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). For an issue
to be genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence
supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a
jury or judge to resolve the parties‟ differing versions of the
truth at trial.” Id. at 248-49 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz.
v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)).
III.
Although Haybarger challenges only the District
Court‟s holding that Mancino was not her employer under the
FMLA, and Mancino concedes in his brief that supervisors at
public agencies are subject to liability under the FMLA, we
have not yet decided whether supervisors at public agencies
are subject to liability under the FMLA. Because we
necessarily must decide whether supervisors at public
agencies are subject to liability before determining whether
the District Court erred in holding that Mancino was not
Haybarger‟s employer, we first address whether the FMLA
permits individual liability against supervisors at public
agencies.3 We then consider whether the District Court erred
After being notified of the settlement of the Rehabilitation
Act claim against Lawrence County Probation, the District
Court entered an order dismissing the action without
prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
Because the District Court dismissed without prejudice, we
originally lacked jurisdiction. However, the District Court
amended its order on November 1, 2011, directing dismissal
with prejudice. Accordingly, we now have jurisdiction. See
Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir.
1983) (a non-final order that becomes final before disposition
on the merits by the Court of Appeals confers jurisdiction).
3

We ordinarily do not address issues that the parties
have not briefed. See Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of
6

in holding that Mancino was not an employer under the
FMLA.
A.
We look first to the FMLA‟s language to ascertain
whether Congress intended to permit individual liability
under the FMLA. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28
(1991) (analyzing congressional intent to hold that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 permits suits against officers in their personal
capacity). The FMLA defines an “employer” as follows:
(A) In general. The term
“employer”-(i) means any person
engaged in commerce or in any
industry or activity affecting
commerce who employs 50 or
Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 158 n.15 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Assocs., 243 F.3d 145, 151 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2001)). However, we “retain[] the independent power to
identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (citing
Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)). We
thus “may consider an issue „antecedent to . . . and ultimately
dispositive of‟ the dispute before [us], even an issue the
parties fail[ed] to identify and brief.” U.S. Nat’l Bank v.
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993) (quoting
Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 77); see also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345
U.S. 83, 87 (1953) (federal courts are “not bound to accept [a
party‟s] concession”). The Supreme Court has cautioned that
“[t]he contrary conclusion would permit litigants, by agreeing
on the legal issue presented, to extract the opinion of a court .
. . that would be difficult to characterize as anything but
advisory.” U.S. Nat’l Bank, 508 U.S. at 447. Because we
have not yet decided whether individual liability against a
supervisor at a public agency is available under the FMLA,
we risk rendering an advisory opinion if we address whether
Mancino is an employer under the FMLA without first
analyzing whether the FMLA permits individual liability.
Accordingly, we first determine whether the FMLA permits
individual liability in the public agency context.
7

more employees for each working
day during each of 20 or more
calendar workweeks in the current
or preceding calendar year;
(ii) includes-(I) any person who acts,
directly or indirectly, in the
interest of an employer to any of
the employees of such employer;
and
(II) any successor in
interest of an employer;
(iii) includes any “public
agency”, as defined in section
3(x) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(x));
and
(iv) includes the General
Accounting Office [Government
Accountability Office] and the
Library of Congress.
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i)-(iv) (emphasis added).
Section 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I)‟s inclusion of “any person
who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an
employer” plainly contemplates that liability for FMLA
violations may be imposed upon an individual person who
would not otherwise be regarded as the plaintiff‟s
“employer.” Indeed, otherwise, § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) adds
nothing to § 2611(4)(A)(i)‟s definition of an employer as
“any person . . . who employs 50 or more employees.” See
Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding
that § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) “plainly includes persons other than
the employer itself”).
The Department of Labor‟s implementing regulations
for the FMLA confirm that the FMLA permits individual
liability. The regulations state that “[e]mployers . . . include
any person acting, directly or indirectly, in the interest of a
covered employer to any of the employees of the employer,
any successor in interest of a covered employer, and any
public agency.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a). The regulations
8

then explicitly provide that “individuals such as corporate
officers „acting in the interest of an employer‟ are
individually liable for any violations of the requirements of
FMLA.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d). In promulgating the
regulations, the Department of Labor responded to concerns
of imposing individual liability under the FMLA by noting
that the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq., which defines “employer” similarly to the FMLA,
already holds “corporate officers, managers and supervisors
acting in the interest of an employer . . . individually liable.” 4
Summary of Major Comments for the FMLA Regulations, 60
Fed. Reg. 2180, 2181 (Jan. 6, 1995) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the FMLA regulations leave little doubt that
individual liability is available under the FMLA.5
As recognized in Modica v. Taylor, “that Congress, in
drafting the FMLA, chose to make the definition of
„employer‟ materially identical to that in the FLSA means
that decisions interpreting the FLSA offer the best guidance
for construing the term „employer‟ as it is used in the
FMLA.” 465 F.3d 174, 186 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 686 (11th Cir. 1999)). We
held under the FLSA that a real estate management company
acting as agent for various building owners is an “employer”
of persons whose wages were paid by the owners. Hodgson
v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 444 F.2d 609, 611 (3d Cir. 1971),
rev’d on other grounds, 410 U.S. 512 (1973). In Hodgson v.
Arnheim & Neely, Inc., a real estate management company
4

Much as under the FMLA, the FLSA defines an
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee and
includes a public agency.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
5

Congress vested the Secretary of Labor with
authority to promulgate regulations to implement the FMLA
under 29 U.S.C. § 2654. See Sommer v. Vanguard Grp., 461
F.3d 397, 399 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006). We give “controlling
weight” to the Secretary of Labor‟s regulations under the
FMLA “unless [the regulations] are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. (quoting Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984)).
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operated eight office buildings and one apartment complex
under a management contract. Id. at 610. The management
company collected rent for each building and deposited the
collections in a separate bank account for each building. Id.
The expenses for each building were paid from the bank
account established for that building. Id. The real estate
management company had the authority to hire and to
supervise each building‟s maintenance employees. Id.
Although the real estate management company exercised
substantial control over employment practices, it lacked
complete authority because the building owners maintained
the right to review hiring practices. Id. at 611. We held that,
despite the building owners‟ right to review employment
practices, the real estate management company was an
employer under the FLSA because it “act[ed] . . . in the
interest of an employer.” Id. at 612 (citations omitted). We
noted that the FLSA “contemplates the possibility of several
simultaneous „employers[,]‟ any one of which may be liable
as an employer under the Act.” Id. at 611-12.
Much as a real estate management company acts as an
agent for building owners, supervisors act as agents for their
employers. Although a supervisor may not have ultimate
authority over employment practices, we held in Hodgson
that a higher decisionmaker‟s ultimate authority does not
relieve lower decisionmakers from liability. Accordingly, we
recognize today that, just as a real estate management
company acting as an agent for building owners may be liable
as an employer under the FLSA, an individual supervisor
working for an employer may be liable as an employer under
the FMLA.6
6

Several district courts have concluded that the FMLA
does not allow individual liability by comparing the FMLA to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., instead of to the FLSA. See, e.g., Frizzell v. Sw.
Motor Freight, 906 F. Supp. 441, 449 (E.D. Tenn. 1995),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 641
(6th Cir. 1998); Carter v. Rental Unif. Serv., 977 F. Supp.
753, 759 (W.D. Va. 1997). Title VII defines an “employer”
as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce . . .
and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Title
VII‟s definition of an employer is much narrower than the
10

Furthermore, we discern no reason to distinguish
between public agencies and private employers under the
FMLA insofar as individual liability is concerned. Under §
2611(4)(A)(iii), an employer includes “any „public agency.‟”
As we discussed supra, the FMLA‟s regulations provide that
“[e]mployers . . . include any person acting, directly or
indirectly, in the interest of a covered employer to any of the
employees of the employer, any successor in interest of a
covered employer, and any public agency.” 29 C.F.R. §
825.104(a). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have already
recognized that the FMLA‟s inclusion of public agencies in
both its statutory language and its regulations demonstrates
that individual supervisors at public agencies are subject to
liability. See Modica, 465 F.3d at 184; Darby, 287 F.3d at
681. District courts within our own circuit have reached the
same conclusion. See, e.g., Kilvitis, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 415;
Hewett v. Willingboro Bd. of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 2d 814, 818
(D.N.J. 2006); Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d
429, 477 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, however, do not
permit individual liability against supervisors at public
agencies. See Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 829 (6th
Cir. 2003); Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686. The Sixth Circuit
reasons that the FMLA does not permit individual liability
because the FMLA‟s individual liability provision does not
refer to the FMLA‟s public agency provision. See Mitchell,
343 F.3d at 829. The Sixth Circuit construes the FMLA as
containing four modifiers of the meaning of “employer” in §
2611(4)(A)(i)-(iv). Id. at 829. According to the Sixth
Circuit, the modifiers in § 2611(4)(A)(i)-(iv) each relate to
the term “employer,” but they do not relate to each other
because “the plain text[] separat[es] . . . the clauses into
distinct provisions.” Id. at 830. The second modifier
provides that “[a]n employer includes any person who acts
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer,” while the
FMLA‟s and the FLSA‟s definition of an employer as any
person acting “directly or indirectly, in the interest of an
employer” in relation to an employee. Because Title VII
defines an employer more narrowly than the FMLA and the
FLSA, decisions construing Title VII do not provide a
persuasive source of authority.
11

third modifier provides that “[a]n employer includes any
„public agency‟ as that term is defined in the FLSA.” Id. at
829 (citing § 2611(4)(A)(ii)-(iii)). Because the Sixth Circuit
does not believe that the individual liability provision in the
second modifier relates to the public agency provision in the
third modifier, the Sixth Circuit holds that individual liability
is not available against supervisors at public agencies. Id. at
830.
The Sixth Circuit indicates that interpreting the
modifiers as relating to each other results in redundancies,
noting most importantly that § 2611(4)(B) states that “a
public agency shall be considered to be a person engaged in
commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce.”
Id. at 831. It reasons that § 2611(4)(B) is superfluous if the
first modifier in § 2611(4)(A)(i), defining an employer as
“any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or
activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more
employees,” relates to the third modifier in § 2611(4)(A)(iii),
stating that employers include public agencies. Id. Further,
the Sixth Circuit adds that the FMLA‟s regulations provide
that a public agency is exempt from § 2611(4)(A)(i)‟s “50 or
more employees” requirement, demonstrating that the first
modifier in § 2611(4)(A)(i) does not relate to the third
modifier in § 2611(4)(A)(iii). Id.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit reasons that combining §
2611(4)(A)(ii)(I)‟s individual liability provision with §
2611(4)(A)(iii)‟s public agency provision results in a
definition of “employer” that is nearly the same as the
FLSA‟s definition of “employer.” Id. Because the FMLA
ordinarily refers to the FLSA when it adopts a definition
found in the FLSA, the Sixth Circuit holds that it is unlikely
that Congress intended to create the same definition of an
“employer” in the FMLA as in the FLSA. Id. Accordingly,
the Sixth Circuit concludes that the FMLA distinguishes
between public agencies and private employers and does not
make individuals at public agencies liable for FMLA
violations.7 Id. at 832.
7

The Eleventh Circuit holds that a public official sued
in his or her individual capacity is not liable under the FMLA
because an individual officer lacks sufficient control over an
12

Although the Sixth Circuit highlights several
ambiguities in the FMLA, we agree with the Fifth Circuit‟s
analysis in Modica. See 465 F.3d at 184-85. First, as the
Fifth Circuit observes, the FMLA indicates a relationship
between § 2611(4)(A)‟s modifiers by stating that the term
“employer” “means” its definition in § 2611(4)(A)(i) and then
“includes” the provisions in § 2611(4)(A)(ii)-(iv). Id. at 185.
Therefore, an “employer” “means any person engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce
who employs 50 or more employees” and “includes” both
“any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of
an employer” and public agencies. Id. Because the definition
of “employer” includes public agencies, and Congress
provided that an employer may include individuals, it plainly
follows that an individual supervisor at a public agency may
be subject to liability. Id.
Next, as the Fifth Circuit notes, § 2611(4)(B)‟s “public
agency” provision is not superfluous when we interpret §
2611(4)(A)(iii)‟s inclusion of public agencies as relating to §
2611(4)(A)(i)‟s definition of an employer because §
2611(4)(B) creates a presumption that public agencies engage
in commerce. See Modica, 465 F.3d at 186. Section
2611(4)(B) thus “relieves plaintiffs of the burden of proving
that a public agency is engaged in commerce.” Id. (citing
Hewett, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 820).
Finally, we agree with the Fifth Circuit‟s reasoning
that the FMLA‟s similarity to the FLSA indicates that
Congress intended for courts to treat the FMLA the same as
the FLSA, rather than treating only specific provisions alike.
See id. Because the FLSA explicitly provides that an
employer includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and
employee‟s employment. See Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d
683, 686 (11th Cir. 1999). Although we agree that an officer
must have control over the terms and conditions of an
employee‟s employment to be liable under the FMLA, we
reject a blanket rule that a public official in his or her
individual capacity never has the requisite control to be an
employer, as we explain in Section III(B) infra.
13

includes a public agency,” we agree that the FMLA similarly
permits individual liability against supervisors at public
agencies. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)).
B.
Having concluded that an individual supervisor at a
public agency may be held liable under the FMLA, we must
next determine whether there exists a genuine dispute of
material fact concerning whether Mancino was Haybarger‟s
employer under the FMLA. We return to the FMLA‟s
statutory language, which states that an “employer” includes
“any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of
an employer to any of the employees of such employer.” §
2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). We believe this language means that an
individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she
exercises “supervisory authority over the complaining
employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged
violation” while acting in the employer‟s interest. Riordan v.
Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing
individual liability under the FLSA‟s analogous definition of
an “employer”). As the Fifth Circuit explained in interpreting
the FLSA‟s analogous employer provision, an individual
supervisor has adequate authority over the complaining
employee when the supervisor “independently exercise[s]
control over the work situation.” Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co.,
747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Donovan v.
Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1983)); see
also Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973) (holding that
a company exercising “substantial control of the terms and
conditions of the work” of the employees is an employer
under the FLSA).
In analyzing an individual supervisor‟s control over
the employee under the FLSA and the FMLA, most courts
look to the “economic reality” of the employment situation,
examining whether the individual supervisor carried out the
functions of an employer with respect to the employee.8 See,
8

The “economic reality” test is a broad test for
determining whether an employment relationship exists, and
is not limited to evaluating whether a supervisor is an
employer for purposes of individual liability. In 1944, the
14

e.g., Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir. 1983)
(analyzing the economic reality to determine whether an
individual is subject to liability under the FLSA); Herman v.
RSR Sec. Servs., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (same);
Donovan, 747 F.2d at 972 (same); Dep’t of Labor v. Cole
Enters., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); Mason v.
Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 774 F. Supp. 2d 349, 367 (D.
Mass. 2011) (discussing economic reality in the context of
individual liability under the FMLA); Smith v. Westchester
Cnty., 769 F. Supp. 2d 448, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(applying the economic reality test to determine whether an
individual is liable under the FMLA). As we recognized in
applying the economic reality test in the context of the FLSA,
whether a person functions as an employer depends on the
totality of the circumstances rather than on “technical
concepts of the employment relationship.” Hodgson, 444
F.2d at 612.
The Second Circuit held that some of the relevant
factors in ascertaining the economic reality of the
employment situation include whether the individual “(1) had
the power to hire and fire the employee[], (2) supervised and
controlled employee work schedules or conditions of
employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment,
and (4) maintained employment records.” Herman, 172 F.3d
Supreme Court first looked to the “underlying economic
facts” to distinguish between employees and independent
contractors under the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB v.
Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944) (citing NLRB
v. Blount, 131 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1942)). Seventeen years
later, the Supreme Court looked to the “economic reality” of
the employment relationship to hold that members of a work
cooperative qualified as employees under the FLSA.
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33
(1961) (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713
(1947)) (additional citation omitted). Since then, we and
other circuits have applied the economic reality test to decide
whether entities qualify as employers under the FLSA. See,
e.g., Hodgson, 444 F.2d at 612; Baystate Alt. Staffing v.
Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998); Bonnette v. Cal.
Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.
1983).
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at 139 (quoting Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8,
12 (2d Cir. 1984)) (citation omitted). The Second Circuit
cautioned, however, that courts must consider “any relevant
evidence” and “[n]o one of the four factors standing alone is
dispositive.”9 Id. (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,
331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)).
Considering Mancino‟s control over Haybarger‟s
employment and the economic reality of Haybarger‟s
employment situation, we believe that Mancino has failed to
demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and [that he] is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Stated otherwise, we believe a
rational juror could find that Mancino had sufficient control
over Haybarger‟s employment so as to be subject to liability
for a violation of the FMLA that he caused to occur.
As an initial matter, there appears to be no dispute that
Mancino acted in the interest of Lawrence County Probation
with respect to Haybarger when he carried out his role as her
supervisor and recommended that Judge Motto terminate her.
Indeed, Mancino stated in Haybarger‟s termination letter that
he was dismissing her because he believed that her dismissal
was “in the best interest of the [Lawrence County Probation]
overall operations.” (A. 99.)
Turning to Mancino‟s control over Haybarger‟s work
situation, Mancino exercised substantial authority over
Haybarger‟s termination decision, even if he lacked final
authority to dismiss her. Most importantly, Mancino admits
that he advised Judge Motto to terminate her. Additionally,
9

The District Court recognized that Mancino‟s control
over Haybarger‟s employment was critical in determining
whether he qualified as an employer under the FMLA.
However, rather than considering the total employment
situation, the District Court considered only Mancino‟s
“power to hire and fire.” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult
Prob. & Parole, No. 06-862, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70421,
at *27 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2010) (quoting Narodetsky v.
Cardone Indus., No. 09-4734, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16133,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2010)). We do not agree that power
to hire and fire is dispositive.
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Mancino was present at the meeting when Haybarger was
informed of her termination, and he wrote her termination
letter, in which he stated, “I feel that no progress or [sic] has
been made by you . . . [so] [a]fter conferring with the District
Court Administrator, Michael Occhibone, and the President
Judge, Dominick Motto, we are in agreement that your
termination . . . is necessary.” (A. 99.) As the Second Circuit
noted, the fact that an employer‟s “hiring decisions
occasionally may be subjected to a third party‟s veto” does
not preclude imposing liability on the employer. Carter, 735
F.2d at 12. Accordingly, a jury could reasonably conclude
that, but for the substantial authority wielded by Mancino,
Judge Motto would not have exercised his ultimate authority
to fire Haybarger.
Additionally, Mancino exercised significant control
over the conditions of Haybarger‟s employment prior to her
termination, even if he did not exercise control over every
aspect. See Herman, 172 F.3d at 139 (an individual need not
engage in “continuous monitoring” for liability to attach).
Mancino supervised Haybarger‟s work, including the
preparation of her annual performance reviews. Further,
Mancino disciplined Haybarger when he was dissatisfied with
her performance, including by issuing a formal discipline
letter in March 2004. Indeed, Mancino concedes that he had
ultimate authority to discipline Haybarger, requiring no
approval from his supervisor. Accordingly, because the
record suggests that Mancino exercised control over the
conditions of Haybarger‟s employment, it cannot be
concluded that no rational jury could find that Mancino
qualified as Haybarger‟s employer under the FMLA. We
therefore do not agree that Mancino is entitled to summary
judgment.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District
Court‟s grant of summary judgment on Haybarger‟s FMLA
claim against William Mancino and remand for further
proceedings.
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